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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The realisation of an open and competitive internal market for electronic 
communications within a single European Information Space still remains a 
challenge for Europe. While the regulatory framework has led to significant benefits 
for citizens and enterprises alike through reduction of prices, increased choices and 
the creation of a level-playing field across the EU, there are still obstacles to the full 
exploitation of the potential of the internal market.
1 
This Communication gives an insight into the experience gained from the market 
review process and highlights some major trends and issues. It complements the 
i2010 Annual report
2 and the 12
th Implementation Report
3. Further, it contributes to 
the review of the regulatory framework that the Commission will propose to the 
Council and the European Parliament in the second half of 2007. It demonstrates that 
the consultation mechanism under Article 7 of the Framework Directive
4 has 
contributed significantly to the coherent implementation of the regulatory 
framework, in particular with regard to market definition and market analysis. At the 
same time, it illustrates that in certain areas, such as the imposition of remedies, there 
is still scope for rendering regulation more effective and for increasing the 
consistency of remedies across the EU in order to work towards an internal market 
for electronic communications. 
2.  OVERVIEW OF THE ARTICLE 7 PROCEDURE  
The key objectives of the regulatory framework that entered into force in 2003 are 
the promotion of competition, investment and innovation within the internal market 
for electronic communications in the interest of consumers and competitiveness. The 
consultation mechanism built in the framework plays a vital role in achieving these 
goals. Regulatory decisions are adopted by the national regulatory authorities 
(NRAs) but the review mechanism at EU level safeguards internal market objectives. 
This role of the Commission under Article 7 of the Framework Directive is decisive 
in helping to (i) ensure consistent regulation across the EU; (ii) to limit regulation 
to markets which will not become competitive without regulatory intervention; and 
(iii) to bring more transparency in the regulatory process. 
Pursuant to Article 7 of the Framework Directive draft regulatory measures of NRAs 
concerning the market review process are to be notified to the Commission and the 
NRAs of other Member States. The Commission may request an NRA to withdraw a 
draft regulatory measure if it is found not to be compatible with Community law, in 
                                                 
1  A single market for citizens, COM(2007) 60 final of 21.2.2007 
2  i2010 - Annual Information Society Report 2007, COM(2007) 146 final of 30.3.2007.  
3 European  Electronic  Communications Regulation and Markets 2006 (12
th Report), COM(2007) 155 of 
29.3.2007. 
4  Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (the “Framework 
Directive”), OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 33.  
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particular as concerns market definition and/or SMP analysis. Such a request for 
withdrawal has been issued by the Commission in five cases. In addition, NRAs have 
decided to take back their notifications in 28 cases. The Commission and the other 
NRAs may also make comments on the imposition of remedies that shall be taken 
utmost account of by the notifying NRA. Thus far, more than 600 draft regulatory 
measures were notified to the Commission, which means that the first round of 
market reviews for the 18 markets referred to in the Commission Recommendation 
2003/311/EC
5 is almost complete.  
A more detailed overview of the procedure can be found in Annex I to this 
Communication. 
3.  INTERNAL MARKET FOR E-COMMUNICATIONS 
Whilst many operators are present in several countries
6, most markets in the 
electronic communications sector are national. Operators which strive to offer similar 
services across Europe, in particular for multinational corporate clients, and to 
simplify the sales and marketing process, depend on reasonably similar wholesale 
inputs across Member States
7. The notifications received so far show that the 
remedies imposed are not always as effective as they could be and that regulation is 
not always consistent across the EU, even in cases where market circumstances are 
similar. Market players wishing to operate in several Member States sometimes face 
a variety of regulatory environments. In order to enable the European electronic 
communications industry to exploit the full potential of the internal market, further 
steps should be taken to ensure effective regulation in all Member States and to 
remove unfounded divergences in regulation across Member States. Without 
consistent ex ante regulation, operators, in particular those who are present in several 
Member States, face difficulties in introducing their offerings on a European basis. 
A lack of regulatory certainty could have detrimental effects on the development of 
the electronic communications sector in the EU
8. During the public consultation on 
                                                 
5  Commission Recommendation 2003/311/EC of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and service 
markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance 
with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory 
framework for electronic communication networks and services ("Recommendation on relevant 
markets"), OJ L 114, 8.5.2003, p. 45. 
6  In the fixed telephony and broadband markets, many operators are active in various Member States and 
even across the EU. Also in mobile markets, several undertakings operate in various Member States, 
with one operator being active in more than half of the EU25. In the satellite broadcasting markets, 
operators already offer cross-border services. See the study entitled "Preparing the Next Steps in 
Regulation of Electronic Communications - A contribution to the review of the electronic 
communications regulatory framework" of July 2006 (the "Hogan & Hartson and Analysys Study"). 
7  See the Hogan & Hartson and Analysys Study. 
8  The electronic communications sector accounts for around 44,5% of the whole ICT sector which is 
valued at 649 billion in 2006 according to the Commission's 12
th Implementation Report.  
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the review of the EU regulatory framework
9 it was suggested that the Commission 
could play a stronger role in the coherent application of remedies.
10 
4.  EXPERIENCE FROM THE NOTIFICATIONS 
The regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services is 
based on regulation of markets, not regulation of technologies. These markets are 
defined and analysed in accordance with competition law principles. Where a given 
market is susceptible to ex ante regulation and an NRA finds one or more 
undertakings to have significant market power or “SMP” (equivalent to “dominance” 
under competition law) on that market, it must impose appropriate regulation. 
Conversely, regulation must not be imposed, or existing regulation must be 
withdrawn on markets where no undertaking is found to have SMP. 
This chapter presents developments in market definition and analysis and highlights 
certain inefficiencies and divergences in the application of remedies that continue to 
exist and risk undermining the internal market. It is complemented by the 
Commission staff working document annexed to this Communication which provides 
a detailed overview.  
4.1.  Market definition and market analysis 
The first Communication on market reviews
11 underlined that the involvement of the 
Commission allowed to achieve a high degree of consistency regarding market 
definition and market analysis. The experience from the notifications received 
thereafter shows that this continues to be the case.  
Under the regulatory framework for electronic communications, markets have to be 
defined according to competition law, taking utmost account of the principle of 
technology neutrality. Since the first Communication on market reviews, the Article 
7 procedure in combination with the Recommendation on relevant markets ensured 
that NRAs define markets in a consistent way, including those that comprise new 
technologies such as high bandwidth broadband services based on VDSL technology. 
The Commission found that a mere upgrade of an existing service delivered via a 
new technology does not in itself constitute a new market.
12 The Commission also 
                                                 
9  See, in particular, the Communication on the Review of the EU Regulatory framework for electronic 
communications, COM(2006) 334 final of 28.6.2006.  
10  See the study by London Economics, in association with PricewaterhouseCoopers, entitled "An 
assessment of the regulatory framework for electronic communications: growth and investment in the 
EU e-Communications sector" of July 2006 (the "LE PWC Study"). 
11  See the Communication on Market reviews under the EU Regulatory Framework, COM(2006) 28 final 
of 7.2.2006. 
12  The Commission sent a letter of formal notice to Germany because of amendments in the German 
Telecoms Act which would effectively exempt fast internet access networks (VDSL) from competition, 
see the press release IP/07/237 of 26.2.2007.   
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gave guidance on the inclusion of leased lines using alternative interfaces, such as 
Ethernet, in the wholesale leased lines markets
13.  
Regarding SMP, NRAs must assess, in line with EU competition law principles and 
taking the utmost account of the SMP guidelines
14, whether an undertaking enjoys a 
dominant position on the relevant market. Very high market shares (above 50%) are 
in themselves, save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence of a 
dominant position, whereas market shares over 40 % would normally raise SMP 
concerns. According to the case law, the inclusion of captive sales in the relevant 
market may depend on whether the traffic generated by a subsidiary of an 
undertaking would be made available in the merchant market in case of an increase 
or decrease of market prices. Other factors relevant for the SMP analysis include 
market dynamics, control of infrastructure that cannot be duplicated easily, barriers 
to entry and potential competition. 
4.2.  Remedies 
When an undertaking enjoys significant market power on a given market, the 
relevant NRA has to impose regulatory obligations which are appropriate to remedy 
the identified competition problem. 
Regarding the choice of remedies, the Commission observes less consistency across 
the EU than has been achieved in market definition and SMP analysis. Differences in 
remedies were not always justified by diverging market conditions or other notified 
specificities. In addition, not always the most efficient remedy was chosen. The 
following sections highlight the main areas of concern. 
4.2.1.  Retail fixed access markets  
In the markets for retail "access" (i.e. connection to a fixed telephony network 
enabling calls and related services) certain NRAs did not impose cost accounting and 
accounting separation obligations or failed to set the appropriate details thereof.
15 
The absence of such obligations in the retail access markets make it difficult to 
impose effective price regulation for various related wholesale products (such as 
wholesale line rental and local loop unbundling) and to monitor compliance with 
non-discrimination obligations. It also makes the ex post enforcement of competition 
rules difficult, for example in cases of anticompetitive pricing.  
                                                 
13  Leased lines with alternative interfaces (including Ethernet) must be included in the markets for 
wholesale leased lines if an assessment according to the principles of competition law indicates that 
wholesale leased lines with alternative interfaces are substitutable for wholesale leased lines with 
traditional interfaces, in particular if their functionality and price levels are equivalent. 
14  Commission Guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the 
Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (the "SMP 
Guidelines"), OJ C 165 11.7.2002, p. 6. 
15  The Commission pointed to the lack of cost orientation and the missing accounting separation in 
Germany and the missing information of the cost accounting methodology in Slovakia.  
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Furthermore the imposition and implementation of wholesale line rental obligations 
varies significantly across Member. The divergences are not always justified on the 
basis of diverging market conditions.
16 Finally, the Commission points out that a lack 
of effective competition in the retail access markets must preferably be addressed 
through effective wholesale regulation (e.g wholesale line rental or local loop 
unbundling). When assessing the need for retail regulation, in particular in a second 
round market analysis, NRAs should first analyse and try to enhance the impact of 
existing wholesale remedies
17. 
Remedies imposed in the retail access markets vary substantially across Member 
States. Such differences are not always justified by diverging market circumstances. 
4.2.2.  Fixed and mobile termination markets 
In principle each operator enjoys a monopoly position for terminating calls on its 
network. Although the measures adopted so far have significantly brought down the 
level of termination rates throughout the European Union, regulation continues to be 
applied unevenly. In particular, the following issues remain of concern. 
Although some form of cost orientation is foreseen in most Member States, a large 
spread in average mobile termination rates still exists across Member States. 
Divergences may be partly justified by differing costs, but are also caused by the 
different price setting methodologies that NRAs apply and the different timeframes 
foreseen for reducing mobile termination rates to the costs of an efficient operator. 
High termination rates thus continue to translate into high, albeit diminishing, prices 
for consumers in a number of Member States. 
Additionally, a number of NRAs authorised high termination rates for smaller 
operators that have not benefited from economies of scale immediately after their 
market entry. This, however, may constitute a disincentive to gain market share at 
retail level, as the enlargement of the customer base would lead to lower regulated 
termination rates. Therefore termination rates should, as a principle, be symmetric, 
whereas asymmetry requires an adequate justification. The Commission recognizes 
that, in certain exceptional cases, asymmetry might be justified by objective cost 
differences which are beyond the control of the operators concerned, e.g. unalterable 
differences in key network elements. If asymmetries in termination rates are not 
based on objective cost differences, they must be phased out within a reasonable time 
frame. 
                                                 
16  For example, the Commission commented on wholesale line rental in Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom 
and asked Poland to specify its wholesale line rental obligation. 
17  In particular, the Commission commented on the need to take into account wholesale remedies in the 
case of Hungary, France, Slovenia and Spain and the enforcement of these remedies in France.  
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In the fixed and mobile termination markets, the Commission emphasized the need to 
move, in principle, towards symmetric termination rates based on costs of an 
efficient operator and encouraged NRAs to lower rates accordingly, in particular for 
mobile termination. As the diverging approaches across Member States have a 
negative effect of on the internal market, the Commission invited NRAs to work 
closely with the European Regulators Group (ERG) to arrive at a coherent EU-wide 
approach on cost calculation and on enhancing symmetry.  
4.2.3.  Wholesale broadband markets (bitstream access and local loop unbundling) 
Efficient regulation of the markets for wholesale broadband access ("bitstream 
access") and for unbundled access is a key factor for the competitive development of 
retail broadband markets and for the development of triple play services provided 
over broadband infrastructure. Bitstream access enables new entrants to provide 
retail broadband access services to end users. It is therefore an important step for new 
entrants towards investment in a more comprehensive roll out of their own network, 
leading towards local loop unbundling. After a certain time, competitors tend to rely 
on a combination of both forms of access, investing in their own infrastructure up to 
the incumbent's local loop where economically possible, i.e. normally in more 
densely populated regions, whereas they depend on bitstream access in rural areas.  
Sometimes the belated
18 application of remedies in the wholesale broadband access 
markets impaired the effectiveness of regulation. In several cases, the points in the 
network at which bitstream access had to be granted were either not specified or 
insufficient to enable the development of competition
19. Price regulation was not 
always effective
20 and based on different price setting methods across the EU. 
Ineffective price regulation in some Member States distorts the internal market and 
gives rise to distortions of competition, mainly through margin squeezes. Not all 
Member States obliged the incumbent to make available "naked DSL" which enables 
alternative operators to provide broadband to end customers without the obligation to 
rent a telephone line from the incumbent
21.  
Due to the high costs of the duplication of the "last mile" of PSTN networks, the 
former monopolists still enjoy a very strong position in the market for wholesale 
unbundled access. Therefore the market was found to be non-competitive by all 
NRAs that have notified this market thus far.  
                                                 
18  For example, the German NRA notified final remedies more than one year after the notification of the 
market analysis. 
19  This was the case in Luxemburg, the Czech Republic and Poland. 
20  In particular Czech Republic, Germany and Finland. 
21  The Commission commented on that matter following notifications from Germany and Luxemburg.  
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In some Member States, parts of the local loop are currently upgraded with fibre 
optic infrastructure between the main distribution frames and the street cabinets. The 
Commission points out that this should not undermine the competitors' ability to gain 
access to an SMP operators' network at an appropriate level in order to be able to 
continue to compete efficiently. In view of these developments the markets for 
bitstream access and local loop unbundling should in the future not be analysed in 
isolation so as to ensure a coherent approach. 
5.  TRENDS IN THE COMPETITVE SITUATION IN MARKETS ANALYSED 
One of the main objectives of the Article 7 mechanism is to limit regulation to those 
markets which, due to inter alia their structural characteristics, offer no perspective 
of becoming effectively competitive without regulatory intervention. This chapter 
deals with certain markets where developments of competition have been observed. 
These developments will be taken into account in the review of the Recommendation 
on relevant markets. The development of all markets mentioned in the 
Recommendation on relevant markets is described in detail in Annex III to this 
Communication.  
5.1.  Retail calls and leased lines markets  
Across the EU, the retail calls markets show a noticeable trend towards competition. 
In several Member States, the markets for international calls in particular have been 
found competitive already in the first round of market analyses.
22 Even in those 
markets which have not been found competitive so far, competitive conditions are 
improving, i.e. prices are falling and new entrants are gaining market share. 
Increased competitive pressure from neighbouring markets, such as mobile, 
constrains the incumbent's behaviour. Wholesale regulation (carrier-selection and 
carrier-pre-selection, sometimes in combination with wholesale line rental) reduces 
barriers to entry. Additionally, the spread of broadband internet connections in 
combination with the emergence of Voice over Broadband (VoB) is expected further 
to enhance competition in the calls markets in the coming years.  
Appropriate regulation at wholesale level should make retail regulation redundant 
once alternative operators have entered the market and are competing with the 
incumbent to deliver better services and lower prices to consumers. NRAs should 
therefore focus on enforcing effective wholesale regulation. They are invited to 
monitor the effects of wholesale regulation carefully and, if necessary, to adjust the 
remedies in the wholesale markets accordingly, with a view to ensuring competition 
at retail level. NRAs are also invited to cooperate closely with national competition 
authorities to ensure that competition in the retail calls markets is not distorted 
through anticompetitive behaviour. 
                                                 
22  This was (partly) the case in Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK.  
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Technological developments as well as the consistent and efficient enforcement of 
appropriate wholesale regulation has enhanced competition in the retail calls and 
leased lines markets. 
5.2.  Markets for wholesale transit and trunk segments of leased lines 
Nine NRAs found the wholesale market for trunk segments of leased lines to be 
effectively competitive.
23 In some Member States, the core network infrastructure of 
the incumbent operators has been duplicated and alternative operators started 
offering trunk leased lines to third parties in competition with the incumbent. 
Networks of alternative operators may not always cover the entire territory of a 
Member State, but in many Member States there is potential to expand coverage. 
This may affect the countervailing buying power of alternative operators vis-à-vis 
incumbents.  
Four NRAs found the transit markets to be competitive. Nevertheless, even in some 
of the non-competitive transit markets, tendencies towards competition emerged as 
the market share of SMP operators, while still significant, eroded because alternative 
operators duplicated infrastructure not only for self-supply, but also in order to offer 
transit services to third parties. The core network infrastructure has been duplicated 
and leased lines, which serve as input to provide transit services are generally 
available.  
It is reasonable to expect that the duplication of backbone infrastructure in transit and 
trunk segments will continue in the future although alternative operators in a number 
of Member States may still depend on the incumbent's lines for some less busy 
routes.  
5.3.  Wholesale mobile access and call origination 
In the first round of market analyses, five NRAs found the wholesale market for 
mobile access and call origination services not to be effectively competitive and 
hence proposed regulation.
24 In other Member States the market was found to be 
competitive. In a number of Member States, mobile access and call origination is 
being provided on a commercial basis. Once service providers have entered the 
market, either through regulated or commercially agreed access arrangements with a 
mobile network operator, the host operator may have an economic interest to 
continue the supply relationship.
25 
                                                 
23  This was the case in Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Slovenia. 
24  In Cyprus and Slovenia, a single operator was found to have SMP. In Ireland, Spain and Malta 
collective dominance was found to exist. In Ireland, the final measure has been withdrawn by the Irish 
regulator following national court procedures.  
25  In case the host operator would cease supplies, the service provider may switch to another wholesale 
supplier. Alternatively, if the service provider exits the retail market, the host operator may not be able 
to capture a sufficient part of the service provider's retail customers to outbalance its lost wholesale 
income.  
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While the market for wholesale mobile access and call origination services has been 
found effectively competitive in most Member States it remains to be assessed 
whether the development of competition e.g. through the existence of MVNO 
agreements, is already sufficient in the wholesale access and call origination market. 
5.4.  Wholesale broadcasting transmission markets 
All NRAs, with the exception of Cyprus, have so far regulated at least a part of the 
wholesale market for broadcasting transmission services. Regulation varies 
substantially across Member States and so do the underlying market conditions. In 
most Member States, terrestrial platforms are predominant, whereas in other Member 
States cable is the main platform. The timing of digital switchover varies across the 
EU and national legislation conferring "must carry" status on certain broadcasters 
also diverges substantially. 
The broadcasting transmission market is characterised by technological progress. 
The spread of digital terrestrial television will enable consumers to receive a larger 
number of programmes. Development of internet TV and digital terrestrial TV might 
prospectively lower the switching costs between infrastructures. The increased 
number of transmission infrastructures should reduce the dependency of broadcasters 
on one particular transmission platform further and increase their countervailing 
buyer power.  
6.  HORIZONTAL ISSUES 
In its first Communication on Market Reviews under the EU Regulatory Framework, 
the Commission encouraged NRAs in particular to obtain the views of market 
players and NCAs prior to the European consultation and noted that a separate 
notification of different stages of the market review unnecessarily prolongs the 
regulatory process. In addition to these concerns, which remain of relevance and 
were re-inforced during the last year, the Commission highlights the following 
horizontal issues. 
6.1.  Streamlining of procedures 
In order to ensure efficient decision making within the rigid timescales provided for 
under Article 7 of the Framework Directive, the Commission has adopted a 
Procedural Recommendation
26. Although this Recommendation contains clear but 
flexible procedures for the cooperation between the Commission and NRAs, 
experience shows that additional implementing measures could be useful to increase 
legal certainty, to minimise the administrative burden for NRAs, operators and the 
Commission and to simplify the process further.  
The Commission will lay down proposals for streamlining the procedures in a 
revised procedural Recommendation, later this year.  
                                                 
26  Commission Recommendation of 2003/561/EC EC of 23 July 2003 on notifications, time limits and 
consultations provided for in Article 7 of the Framework Directive (“the Procedural 
Recommendation”), OJ L 190, 30.7.2003, p. 13.  
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6.2.  Belated adoption of final measures and implementation of remedies  
As electronic communications markets often evolve quickly, regulatory intervention 
can tackle market failures efficiently only if regulatory measures are implemented in 
an expedient manner. 
In certain Member States, NRAs adopted final measures with significant delays after 
the completion of the market review process. These delays should be avoided in 
order to guarantee a timely reaction to market failures identified through the market 
review process.  
Additionally, delays continue to occur in certain Member States because remedies 
are notified separately from the underlying market definition and analysis. As a 
consequence, market failures are not tackled in a timely fashion, which reduces the 
effectiveness of regulation and thus creates risks for the competitiveness of the 
sector. 
NRAs are urged to conduct and notify all stages of a market review at the same time 
(market definition, market analysis and the intended regulatory obligations). 
Finally, in some cases a significant period has elapsed without re-notification of a 
draft measure that had to be withdrawn. The draft measure in question should be 
amended and submitted to national consultation as soon as possible after the 
Commission requires the NRA to withdraw the measure so as to ensure that 
competition problems are addressed as quickly as possible.  
Some NRAs have imposed generic measures and have left the details of remedies for 
commercial negotiations between market players, e.g. by imposing a general cost 
orientation obligation without specifying price ceilings or detailed cost accounting 
obligations. If negotiations between market players failed, the NRA would intervene 
in a dispute settlement in order to impose specific prices on the basis of the cost 
orientation obligation. While in principle the undertakings should themselves 
negotiate in good faith their access and interconnection agreements
27, the competitive 
problems identified in the context of the regulatory procedures should be tackled as 
soon and as effectively as possible. The implicit threat of further regulatory 
intervention, either in the context of a dispute settlement or ex officio, if commercial 
negotiations fail to remedy the competition problem identified, seems insufficient as 
it might not provide transparency and legal certainty for market players and could 
cause unnecessary delays.  
Remedies should be defined in a sufficiently clear and detailed fashion in the final 
measures and should be suitable to tackle the identified competitive failures 
efficiently. 
                                                 
27  See Recitals 5 and 6 and Article 4 of the Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and 
associated facilities 8the "Access Directive"), OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p.7.  
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6.3.  Application of Article 5 of the Access Directive 
Member States have used Article 5(1) of the Access Directive in several cases
28. It 
allows Member States to impose regulatory measures on non-SMP operators to the 
extent it is necessary to ensure end-to-end connectivity. The Commission has pointed 
out that Article 5 must not be used to circumvent the market analysis process and 
should be used only in cases where end-to end connectivity needs to be guaranteed. 
NRAs should use their powers under Article 5 of the Access Directive only in clearly 
defined circumstances in order to avoid overregulation and insecurity in the markets. 
7.  CONCLUSIONS  
Almost all NRAs have finalised the first round of market reviews of the 18 markets 
included in the Recommendation, with the exception of the NRAs in Bulgaria and 
Romania that joined the EU only on 1 January 2007. The EU consultation 
mechanism established under Article 7 of the Framework Directive has been 
instrumental for the promotion of competition, investment and innovation as well 
as for the consolidation of the internal market for electronic communications. It 
has ensured a consistent approach, in particular regarding market definition and SMP 
analysis across Europe, brought sound economic analysis to the market review 
process and resulted in increased transparency. Overall, this form of cooperation 
between the Commission and NRAs led to better regulation based on competition 
principles and contributed to the development of a common European regulatory 
culture. The Commission's comments on the proposed remedies gave guidance 
towards a consistent regulatory approach across Europe, whilst taking into account 
specific national circumstances. The Commission focussed on ensuring that remedies 
are appropriate, i.e. based on the nature of the problem identified, proportionate and 
justified in the light of the objectives laid down in the Framework Directive.  
However further steps need to be taken to enhance the effectiveness of regulation and 
to achieve greater consistency in the selection and application of remedies. 
Although the regulatory approaches for market definition and market power analysis 
have converged to a large extent, remedies are not always appropriate to resolve 
the identified competition problems and sometimes differ markedly amongst 
Member States in spite of similar market situations. 
. 
                                                 
28  In the case NL/2003/17, the Dutch Ministry for economic affairs notified a decree that contained a 
general obligation to ensure end-to-end connectivity for all publicly available telephone services in the 
Netherlands. In case UK/2003/19, the British NRA notified an obligation for the only provider of access 
control services for digital TV (Sky Subscriber Services Limited) to provide access to these services on 
fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. The Polish NRA imposed a non-discrimination and 
transparency obligation on the incumbent, in particular in order to prevent it from interfering with the 
quality of IP transmission between its customers and other electronic communications operators (see 
case PL/2006/0382). In case UK/2006/0454, the British NRA proposed to impose an access related 
obligation on BT, according to which BT is required to purchase wholesale narrowband call termination 
services from any operator of a public electronic communications network.  
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The Commission will strive to further streamline procedures and to minimise the 
administrative burden for market players and NRAs, in line with the 
Commission's strategy for better regulation
29..  It will make corresponding 
proposals in the context of the review of the regulatory framework. In addition, the 
Commission invites Member States to contribute to the streamlining of the 
market review process at the national level. In particular, NRAs should avoid (i) 
delays between the notification of draft measures and the adoption of final measures, 
and (ii) notifying market analysis and intended remedies in different steps.  
The Commission is currently reviewing the regulatory framework for e-
communications and its proposal will be put forward to the Council and the 
Parliament in the second half of 2007. The revised regulatory framework however is 
not expected to enter into force before 2009-2010. In the short term the Commission 
is reviewing the Recommendation on relevant markets and the Article 7 procedural 
Recommendation and the new versions of the texts will be adopted in the second half 
of 2007.  
                                                 
29  See in particular the Commission Communication, Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs in the 
European Union, COM(2005) 97 final of 16.3.2005. 